csrp-gmp/srp.h

171 lines
7.1 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
/*
* Secure Remote Password 6a implementation
2015-04-16 10:07:34 -07:00
* https://github.com/est31/csrp-gmp
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
*
* The MIT License (MIT)
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2015-04-16 10:07:34 -07:00
* Copyright (c) 2010, 2013 Tom Cocagne, 2015 est31 <MTest31@outlook.com>
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
* use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
* of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
* so, subject to the following conditions:
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
* SOFTWARE.
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
*/
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
/*
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* Purpose: This is a direct implementation of the Secure Remote Password
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
* Protocol version 6a as described by
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* Author: tom.cocagne@gmail.com (Tom Cocagne)
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
* Dependencies: LibGMP
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* Usage: Refer to test_srp.c for a demonstration
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* Notes:
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
* This library allows multiple combinations of hashing algorithms and
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* prime number constants. For authentication to succeed, the hash and
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
* prime number constants must match between
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* srp_create_salted_verification_key(), srp_user_new(),
* and srp_verifier_new(). A recommended approach is to determine the
* desired level of security for an application and globally define the
* hash and prime number constants to the predetermined values.
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* As one might suspect, more bits means more security. As one might also
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
* suspect, more bits also means more processing time. The test_srp.c
* program can be easily modified to profile various combinations of
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* hash & prime number pairings.
*/
#ifndef SRP_H
#define SRP_H
struct SRPVerifier;
struct SRPUser;
typedef enum
{
SRP_NG_1024,
SRP_NG_2048,
SRP_NG_4096,
SRP_NG_8192,
SRP_NG_CUSTOM
} SRP_NGType;
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
typedef enum
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
{
SRP_SHA1,
/*SRP_SHA224,*/
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
SRP_SHA256,
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
/*SRP_SHA384,
SRP_SHA512*/
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
} SRP_HashAlgorithm;
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
/* Out: bytes_v, len_v
*
* The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_v
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type.
* If provided, they must contain ASCII text of the hexidecimal notation.
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
* If bytes_s == NULL, it is filled with random data. The caller is responsible for freeing.
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
*/
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
void srp_create_salted_verification_key( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg,
SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username_for_verifier,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char * password, int len_password,
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v,
const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
/* Out: bytes_B, len_B.
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
*
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type
*
* If bytes_b == NULL, random data is used for b.
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
*/
struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char * username,
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v,
const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A,
const unsigned char * bytes_b, int len_b,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B,
const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
/* key_length may be null */
const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver, int * key_length );
int srp_verifier_get_session_key_length( struct SRPVerifier * ver );
/* user_M must be exactly srp_verifier_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver,
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
const unsigned char * user_M,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK );
/*******************************************************************************/
/* The n_hex and g_hex parameters should be 0 unless SRP_NG_CUSTOM is used for ng_type */
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( SRP_HashAlgorithm alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
const char * username, const char * username_for_verifier,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password,
const char * n_hex, const char * g_hex );
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr );
int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr);
const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr );
/* key_length may be null */
const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr, int * key_length );
int srp_user_get_session_key_length( struct SRPUser * usr );
/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A. If you don't want it get written, set username to NULL.
* If bytes_a == NULL, random data is used for a. */
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username,
const unsigned char * bytes_a, int len_a,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A );
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
/* Output: bytes_M, len_M (len_M may be null and will always be
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
* srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size) */
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr,
const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s,
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B,
const unsigned char ** bytes_M, int * len_M );
2015-04-11 18:40:29 -07:00
2013-04-02 19:32:42 -07:00
/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly srp_user_get_session_key_length() bytes in size */
void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK );
#endif /* Include Guard */