Mypal/security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_content_signing.js

267 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript

/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
"use strict";
// These tests ensure content signatures are working correctly.
// First, we need to set up some data
const PREF_SIGNATURE_ROOT = "security.content.signature.root_hash";
const TEST_DATA_DIR = "test_content_signing/";
const ONECRL_NAME = "oneCRL-signer.mozilla.org";
const ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME = "remotenewtab.content-signature.mozilla.org";
function getSignatureVerifier() {
return Cc["@mozilla.org/security/contentsignatureverifier;1"]
.createInstance(Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier);
}
function setRoot(filename) {
let cert = constructCertFromFile(filename);
Services.prefs.setCharPref(PREF_SIGNATURE_ROOT, cert.sha256Fingerprint);
}
function loadChain(prefix, names) {
let chain = [];
for (let name of names) {
let filename = `${prefix}_${name}.pem`;
chain.push(readFile(do_get_file(filename)));
}
return chain;
}
function run_test() {
// set up some data
const DATA = readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + 'test.txt'));
const GOOD_SIGNATURE = "p384ecdsa=" +
readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + 'test.txt.signature'))
.trim();
const BAD_SIGNATURE = "p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2r" +
"UWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1G" +
"q25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L";
let remoteNewTabChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
["remote_newtab_ee", "int", "root"]);
let oneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
["onecrl_ee", "int", "root"]);
let oneCRLBadKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
["onecrl_wrong_key_ee", "int", "root"]);
let oneCRLRSAKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
["onecrl_RSA_ee", "int", "root"]);
let noSANChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing",
["onecrl_no_SAN_ee", "int", "root"]);
// Check signature verification works without error before the root is set
let chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
let verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
"Before the root is set, signatures should fail to verify but not throw.");
setRoot(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing_root.pem");
// Check good signatures from good certificates with the correct SAN
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
"A OneCRL signature should verify with the OneCRL chain");
let chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain2,
ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME),
"A newtab signature should verify with the newtab chain");
// Check a bad signature when a good chain is provided
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, BAD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME),
"A bad signature should not verify");
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
// one used to create the signature
let badKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, badKeyChain,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong");
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
// one used to create the signature (this time, an RSA key)
let rsaKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, rsaKeyChain,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong (RSA)");
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with chain missing root
let missingRoot = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[1]].join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, missingRoot,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing root)");
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with no path to root
let missingInt = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, missingInt,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing int)");
// Check good signatures from good certificates with the wrong SANs
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME),
"A OneCRL signature should not verify if we require the newtab SAN");
chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain2,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A newtab signature should not verify if we require the OneCRL SAN");
// Check good signatures with good chains with some other invalid names
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ""),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match an empty name");
let relatedName = "subdomain." + ONECRL_NAME;
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
relatedName),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a related name");
let randomName = "\xb1\x9bU\x1c\xae\xaa3\x19H\xdb\xed\xa1\xa1\xe0\x81\xfb" +
"\xb2\x8f\x1cP\xe5\x8b\x9c\xc2s\xd3\x1f\x8e\xbbN";
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, randomName),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a random name");
// check good signatures with chains that have strange or missing SANs
chain1 = noSANChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(!verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1,
ONECRL_NAME),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a supplied name");
// Check malformed signature data
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
let bad_signatures = [
// wrong length
"p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-" +
"7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L==",
// incorrectly encoded
"p384ecdsa='WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi" +
"-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L=",
// missing directive
"other_directive=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ec" +
"HiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L",
// actually sha256 with RSA
"p384ecdsa=XS_jiQsS5qlzQyUKaA1nAnQn_OvxhvDfKybflB8Xe5gNH1wNmPGK1qN-jpeTfK" +
"6ob3l3gCTXrsMnOXMeht0kPP3wLfVgXbuuO135pQnsv0c-ltRMWLe56Cm4S4Z6E7WWKLPWaj" +
"jhAcG5dZxjffP9g7tuPP4lTUJztyc4d1z_zQZakEG7R0vN7P5_CaX9MiMzP4R7nC3H4Ba6yi" +
"yjlGvsZwJ_C5zDQzWWs95czUbMzbDScEZ_7AWnidw91jZn-fUK3xLb6m-Zb_b4GAqZ-vnXIf" +
"LpLB1Nzal42BQZn7i4rhAldYdcVvy7rOMlsTUb5Zz6vpVW9LCT9lMJ7Sq1xbU-0g=="
];
for (let badSig of bad_signatures) {
throws(() => {
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, badSig, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
}, /NS_ERROR/, `Bad or malformed signature "${badSig}" should be rejected`);
}
// Check malformed and missing certificate chain data
let chainSuffix = [oneCRLChain[1], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
let badChains = [
// no data
"",
// completely wrong data
"blah blah \n blah",
];
let badSections = [
// data that looks like PEM but isn't
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n",
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
// data that will start to parse but won't base64decode
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
// data with garbage outside of PEM sections
"this data is garbage\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n" +
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
];
for (let badSection of badSections) {
// ensure we test each bad section on its own...
badChains.push(badSection);
// ... and as part of a chain with good certificates
badChains.push(badSection + '\n' + chainSuffix);
}
for (let badChain of badChains) {
throws(() => {
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, badChain,
ONECRL_NAME);
}, /NS_ERROR/, `Bad chain data starting "${badChain.substring(0, 80)}" ` +
"should be rejected");
}
// Check the streaming interface works OK when a good chain / data
// combination is provided
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
verifier.update(DATA);
ok(verifier.end(),
"A good signature should verify using the stream interface");
// Check that the streaming interface works with multiple update calls
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
for (let c of DATA) {
verifier.update(c);
}
ok(verifier.end(),
"A good signature should verify using multiple updates");
// Check that the streaming interface works with multiple update calls and
// some data provided in CreateContext
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
let start = DATA.substring(0, 5);
let rest = DATA.substring(start.length);
verifier.createContext(start, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
for (let c of rest) {
verifier.update(c);
}
ok(verifier.end(),
"A good signature should verify using data in CreateContext and updates");
// Check that a bad chain / data combination fails
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
ok(!verifier.end(),
"A bad signature should fail using the stream interface");
// Check that re-creating a context throws ...
verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
verifier.createContext("", GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
// ... firstly, creating a context explicitly
throws(() => {
verifier.createContext(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
}, /NS_ERROR/, "Ensure a verifier cannot be re-used with createContext");
// ... secondly, by calling verifyContentSignature
throws(() => {
verifier.verifyContentSignature(DATA, GOOD_SIGNATURE, chain1, ONECRL_NAME);
}, /NS_ERROR/, "Ensure a verifier cannot be re-used with verifyContentSignature");
run_next_test();
}