commit 7ec0c6c2ae298d6d2e6292c8178e1e620de99272 Author: Tom Cocagne Date: Fri Oct 1 14:32:10 2010 -0400 initial commit diff --git a/srp.c b/srp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ddff9b --- /dev/null +++ b/srp.c @@ -0,0 +1,569 @@ +/* + * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation + * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved. + * http://csrp.googlecode.com/p/csrp/ + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of the Google Code nor the + * names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL TOM COCAGNE BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND + * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +#ifdef WIN32 + #include +#else + #include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#include "srp.h" + +/* 2048-bit prime & generator pair from RFC 5054 */ +#define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define G_HEX "2" + + +static const BIGNUM * N = 0; +static const BIGNUM * g = 0; +static const BIGNUM * k = 0; +static int g_initialized = 0; + +struct SRPVerifier +{ + const char * username; + const unsigned char * bytes_B; + int authenticated; + + unsigned char M [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char H_AMK [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char session_key [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}; + + +struct SRPUser +{ + BIGNUM *a; + BIGNUM *A; + BIGNUM *S; + + const unsigned char * bytes_A; + int authenticated; + + const char * username; + const unsigned char * password; + int password_len; + + unsigned char M [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char H_AMK [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + unsigned char session_key [SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; +}; + + + +static BIGNUM * H_nn( const BIGNUM * n1, const BIGNUM * n2 ) +{ + unsigned char buff[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + int len_n1 = BN_num_bytes(n1); + int len_n2 = BN_num_bytes(n2); + int nbytes = len_n1 + len_n2; + unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) alloca( nbytes ); + BN_bn2bin(n1, bin); + BN_bn2bin(n2, bin + len_n1); + SHA256( bin, nbytes, buff ); + return BN_bin2bn(buff, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); +} + +static BIGNUM * H_ns( const BIGNUM * n, const unsigned char * bytes, int len_bytes ) +{ + unsigned char buff[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + int len_n = BN_num_bytes(n); + int nbytes = len_n + len_bytes; + unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) alloca( nbytes ); + BN_bn2bin(n, bin); + memcpy( bin + len_n, bytes, len_bytes ); + SHA256( bin, nbytes, buff ); + return BN_bin2bn(buff, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL); +} + +static BIGNUM * calculate_x( const BIGNUM * salt, const char * username, const unsigned char * password, int password_len ) +{ + unsigned char ucp_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + SHA256_CTX ctx; + + SHA256_Init( &ctx ); + + SHA256_Update( &ctx, username, strlen(username) ); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, ":", 1 ); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, password, password_len ); + + SHA256_Final( ucp_hash, &ctx ); + + return H_ns( salt, ucp_hash, sizeof(ucp_hash) ); +} + +static void update_hash( SHA256_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM * n ) +{ + unsigned long len = BN_num_bytes(n); + unsigned char * n_bytes = (unsigned char *) alloca( len ); + BN_bn2bin(n, n_bytes); + SHA256_Update(ctx, n_bytes, len); +} + +static void hash_num( const BIGNUM * n, unsigned char * dest ) +{ + int nbytes = BN_num_bytes(n); + unsigned char * bin = (unsigned char *) alloca( nbytes ); + BN_bn2bin(n, bin); + SHA256( bin, nbytes, dest ); +} + +static void calculate_M( unsigned char * dest, const char * I, const BIGNUM * s, + const BIGNUM * A, const BIGNUM * B, const unsigned char * K ) +{ + unsigned char H_N[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + unsigned char H_g[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + unsigned char H_I[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + unsigned char H_xor[ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ]; + SHA256_CTX ctx; + int i = 0; + + hash_num( N, H_N ); + hash_num( g, H_g ); + + SHA256((const unsigned char *)I, strlen(I), H_I); + + for (i=0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++ ) + H_xor[i] = H_N[i] ^ H_g[i]; + + SHA256_Init( &ctx ); + + SHA256_Update( &ctx, H_xor, sizeof(H_xor) ); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, H_I, sizeof(H_I) ); + update_hash( &ctx, s ); + update_hash( &ctx, A ); + update_hash( &ctx, B ); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, K, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ); + + SHA256_Final( dest, &ctx ); +} + +static void calculate_H_AMK( unsigned char *dest, const BIGNUM * A, const unsigned char * M, const unsigned char * K ) +{ + SHA256_CTX ctx; + + SHA256_Init( &ctx ); + + update_hash( &ctx, A ); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, M, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); + SHA256_Update( &ctx, K, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); + + SHA256_Final( dest, &ctx ); +} + + +/*********************************************************************************************************** + * + * Exported Functions + * + ***********************************************************************************************************/ + +void srp_init() +{ +#ifdef WIN32 + HCRYPTPROV wctx; +#else + FILE *fp = 0; +#endif + + unsigned char buff[32]; + + BIGNUM *tN = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tg = BN_new(); + + BN_hex2bn( &tN, N_HEX ); + BN_hex2bn( &tg, G_HEX ); + + N = tN; + g = tg; + + k = H_nn(N,g); + +#ifdef WIN32 + + CryptAcquireContext(&wctx, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT); + + CryptGenRandom(wctx, sizeof(buff), (BYTE*) buff); + + CryptReleaseContext(wctx, 0); + +#else + fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r"); + + if (fp) + { + fread(buff, sizeof(buff), 1, fp); + fclose(fp); + + } + else + { + /* Dirty... but better than nothing. */ + gettimeofday( (struct timeval *)buff, 0); + } +#endif + + RAND_seed( buff, sizeof(buff) ); + + g_initialized = 1; +} + + +void srp_fini() +{ + g_initialized = 0; + + BN_free((BIGNUM *)N); + BN_free((BIGNUM *)g); + BN_free((BIGNUM *)k); + + N = 0; + g = 0; +} + + +int srp_is_initialized() +{ + return g_initialized; +} + + +void srp_gen_sv( const char * username, + const unsigned char * password, int len_password, + const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s, + const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v ) +{ + BIGNUM * s = BN_new(); + BIGNUM * v = BN_new(); + BIGNUM * x = 0; + BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + BN_rand(s, 32, -1, 0); + + x = calculate_x( s, username, password, len_password ); + + BN_mod_exp(v, g, x, N, ctx); + + *len_s = BN_num_bytes(s); + *len_v = BN_num_bytes(v); + + *bytes_s = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_s ); + *bytes_v = (const unsigned char *) malloc( *len_v ); + + BN_bn2bin(s, (unsigned char *) *bytes_s); + BN_bn2bin(v, (unsigned char *) *bytes_v); + + BN_free(s); + BN_free(v); + BN_free(x); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); +} + + + +/* Out: bytes_B, len_B. + * + * On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0 + */ +struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( const char * username, + const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s, + const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v, + const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A, + const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B) +{ + BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL); + BIGNUM *v = BN_bin2bn(bytes_v, len_v, NULL); + BIGNUM *A = BN_bin2bn(bytes_A, len_A, NULL); + BIGNUM *u = 0; + BIGNUM *B = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *S = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *b = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new(); + BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + int ulen = strlen(username) + 1; + + struct SRPVerifier * ver = (struct SRPVerifier *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPVerifier) ); + + ver->username = (char *) malloc( ulen ); + + memcpy( (char*)ver->username, username, ulen ); + + ver->authenticated = 0; + + /* SRP-6a safety check */ + BN_mod(tmp1, A, N, ctx); + if ( !BN_is_zero(tmp1) ) + { + BN_rand(b, 256, -1, 0); + + /* B = kv + g^b */ + BN_mul(tmp1, k, v, ctx); + BN_mod_exp(tmp2, g, b, N, ctx); + BN_add(B, tmp1, tmp2); + + u = H_nn(A,B); + + /* S = (A *(v^u)) ^ b */ + BN_mod_exp(tmp1, v, u, N, ctx); + BN_mul(tmp2, A, tmp1, ctx); + BN_mod_exp(S, tmp2, b, N, ctx); + + hash_num(S, ver->session_key); + + calculate_M( ver->M, username, s, A, B, ver->session_key ); + calculate_H_AMK( ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key ); + + *len_B = BN_num_bytes(B); + *bytes_B = malloc( *len_B ); + + BN_bn2bin( B, (unsigned char *) *bytes_B ); + + ver->bytes_B = *bytes_B; + } + else + { + *len_B = 0; + *bytes_B = NULL; + } + + BN_free(s); + BN_free(v); + BN_free(A); + if (u) BN_free(u); + BN_free(B); + BN_free(S); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(tmp1); + BN_free(tmp2); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + return ver; +} + + + + +void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver ) +{ + free( (char *) ver->username ); + free( (unsigned char *) ver->bytes_B ); + free( ver ); +} + + + +int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver ) +{ + return ver->authenticated; +} + + +const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver ) +{ + return ver->username; +} + +/* Key length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver ) +{ + return ver->session_key; +} + + + +/* user_M must be exactly SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */ +void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver, const unsigned char * user_M, const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK ) +{ + if ( memcmp( ver->M, user_M, SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ) == 0 ) + { + ver->authenticated = 1; + *bytes_HAMK = ver->H_AMK; + } + else + *bytes_HAMK = NULL; +} + +/*******************************************************************************/ + +struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( const char * username, + const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password ) +{ + struct SRPUser *usr = (struct SRPUser *) malloc( sizeof(struct SRPUser) ); + int ulen = strlen(username) + 1; + + usr->a = BN_new(); + usr->A = BN_new(); + usr->S = BN_new(); + + usr->username = (const char *) malloc(ulen); + usr->password = (const unsigned char *) malloc(len_password); + usr->password_len = len_password; + + memcpy((char *)usr->username, username, ulen); + memcpy((char *)usr->password, bytes_password, len_password); + + usr->bytes_A = 0; + + return usr; +} + + + +void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr ) +{ + BN_free( usr->a ); + BN_free( usr->A ); + BN_free( usr->S ); + + free((char *)usr->username); + free((char *)usr->password); + + if (usr->bytes_A) + free( (char *)usr->bytes_A ); + + free( usr ); +} + + + +int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr) +{ + return usr->authenticated; +} + + +const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr ) +{ + return usr->username; +} + + + +/* Key length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr ) +{ + return usr->session_key; +} + +/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */ +void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username, + const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A ) +{ + BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + BN_rand(usr->a, 256, -1, 0); + + BN_mod_exp(usr->A, g, usr->a, N, ctx); + + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + + *len_A = BN_num_bytes(usr->A); + *bytes_A = malloc( *len_A ); + + BN_bn2bin( usr->A, (unsigned char *) *bytes_A ); + + usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A; + *username = usr->username; +} + + +/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr, + const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s, + const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B, + const unsigned char ** bytes_M ) +{ + BIGNUM *s = BN_bin2bn(bytes_s, len_s, NULL); + BIGNUM *B = BN_bin2bn(bytes_B, len_B, NULL); + BIGNUM *u = 0; + BIGNUM *x = 0; + BIGNUM *v = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tmp1 = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tmp2 = BN_new(); + BIGNUM *tmp3 = BN_new(); + BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + + u = H_nn(usr->A,B); + + x = calculate_x( s, usr->username, usr->password, usr->password_len ); + + /* SRP-6a safety check */ + if ( !BN_is_zero(B) && !BN_is_zero(u) ) + { + BN_mod_exp(v, g, x, N, ctx); + + /* S = (B - k*(g^x)) ^ (a + ux) */ + BN_mul(tmp1, u, x, ctx); + BN_add(tmp2, usr->a, tmp1); /* tmp2 = (a + ux) */ + BN_mod_exp(tmp1, g, x, N, ctx); + BN_mul(tmp3, k, tmp1, ctx); /* tmp3 = k*(g^x) */ + BN_sub(tmp1, B, tmp3); /* tmp1 = (B - K*(g^x)) */ + BN_mod_exp(usr->S, tmp1, tmp2, N, ctx); + + hash_num(usr->S, usr->session_key); + + calculate_M( usr->M, usr->username, s, usr->A, B, usr->session_key ); + calculate_H_AMK( usr->H_AMK, usr->A, usr->M, usr->session_key ); + + *bytes_M = usr->M; + } + else + { + *bytes_M = NULL; + } + + BN_free(s); + BN_free(B); + BN_free(u); + BN_free(x); + BN_free(v); + BN_free(tmp1); + BN_free(tmp2); + BN_free(tmp3); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); +} + +/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */ +void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK ) +{ + if ( memcmp( usr->H_AMK, bytes_HAMK, SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ) == 0 ) + usr->authenticated = 1; +} diff --git a/srp.h b/srp.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea71172 --- /dev/null +++ b/srp.h @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +/* + * Secure Remote Password 6a implementation + * Copyright (c) 2010 Tom Cocagne. All rights reserved. + * http://csrp.googlecode.com/p/csrp/ + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * * Neither the name of the Google Code nor the + * names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" + * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL TOM COCAGNE BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES + * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND + * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + */ + +/* + * + * Purpose: This is a direct implementation of the Secure Remote Password + * Protocol version 6a as described by + * http://srp.stanford.edu/design.html + * + * Author: tom.cocagne@gmail.com (Tom Cocagne) + * + * Dependencies: OpenSSL (and Advapi32.lib on Windows) + * + * Usage: Refer to test_srp.c for a demonstration + * + * Note: + * The SRP protocol does not mandate a specific hashing algorithm. This + * implementation uses SHA256 rather than SHA1 for additional security + * and the increased number of bytes in the resulting shared key. However, + * SHA256 is approximately 20% slower than SHA1. If speed is more important + * than the key length and/or added security, you may change it to SHA1. + * + */ + +#ifndef SRP_H +#define SRP_H + +#define SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32 + +/* srp_init() must be called prior to usage of any other srp_* functions. + * and a matching srp_fini() will clean up all memory allocated by srp_init(). + */ +void srp_init(); +void srp_fini(); + +/* Returns 1 if srp_init() if the library is initialized */ +int srp_is_initialized(); + + +struct SRPVerifier; +struct SRPUser; + + +/* Out: bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v + * + * The caller is responsible for freeing the memory allocated for bytes_s and bytes_v + */ +void srp_gen_sv( const char * username, + const unsigned char * password, int len_password, + const unsigned char ** bytes_s, int * len_s, + const unsigned char ** bytes_v, int * len_v ); + + +/* Out: bytes_B, len_B. + * + * On failure, bytes_B will be set to NULL and len_B will be set to 0 + */ +struct SRPVerifier * srp_verifier_new( const char * username, + const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s, + const unsigned char * bytes_v, int len_v, + const unsigned char * bytes_A, int len_A, + const unsigned char ** bytes_B, int * len_B); + + +void srp_verifier_delete( struct SRPVerifier * ver ); + + +int srp_verifier_is_authenticated( struct SRPVerifier * ver ); + + +const char * srp_verifier_get_username( struct SRPVerifier * ver ); + + +/* Key length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +const unsigned char * srp_verifier_get_session_key( struct SRPVerifier * ver ); + + +/* user_M must be exactly SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */ +void srp_verifier_verify_session( struct SRPVerifier * ver, + const unsigned char * user_M, + const unsigned char ** bytes_HAMK ); + +/*******************************************************************************/ + +struct SRPUser * srp_user_new( const char * username, + const unsigned char * bytes_password, int len_password ); + +void srp_user_delete( struct SRPUser * usr ); + +int srp_user_is_authenticated( struct SRPUser * usr); + + +const char * srp_user_get_username( struct SRPUser * usr ); + +/* Key length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +const unsigned char * srp_user_get_session_key( struct SRPUser * usr ); + +/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */ +void srp_user_start_authentication( struct SRPUser * usr, const char ** username, + const unsigned char ** bytes_A, int * len_A ); + +/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH */ +void srp_user_process_challenge( struct SRPUser * usr, + const unsigned char * bytes_s, int len_s, + const unsigned char * bytes_B, int len_B, + const unsigned char ** bytes_M ); + +/* bytes_HAMK must be exactly SRP_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size */ +void srp_user_verify_session( struct SRPUser * usr, const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK ); + +#endif /* Include Guard */ diff --git a/test_srp.c b/test_srp.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..338ddc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/test_srp.c @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#include "srp.h" + + +#define NITER 100 + + +unsigned long long get_usec() +{ + struct timeval t; + gettimeofday(&t, NULL); + return (((unsigned long long)t.tv_sec) * 1000000) + t.tv_usec; +} + + +int main( int argc, char * argv[] ) +{ + struct SRPVerifier * ver; + struct SRPUser * usr; + + const unsigned char * bytes_s = 0; + const unsigned char * bytes_v = 0; + const unsigned char * bytes_A = 0; + const unsigned char * bytes_B = 0; + + const unsigned char * bytes_M = 0; + const unsigned char * bytes_HAMK = 0; + + int len_s = 0; + int len_v = 0; + int len_A = 0; + int len_B = 0; + int i; + + unsigned long long start; + unsigned long long duration; + + const char * username = "testuser"; + const char * password = "password"; + + const char * auth_username = 0; + + srp_init(NULL,0); + + srp_gen_sv( username, password, strlen(password), + &bytes_s, &len_s, &bytes_v, &len_v ); + + + + start = get_usec(); + + for( i = 0; i < NITER; i++ ) + { + usr = srp_user_new( username, password, strlen(password) ); + + srp_user_start_authentication( usr, &auth_username, &bytes_A, &len_A ); + + /* User -> Host: (username, bytes_A) */ + ver = srp_verifier_new( username, bytes_s, len_s, bytes_v, len_v, + bytes_A, len_A, & bytes_B, &len_B ); + + if ( !bytes_B ) + { + printf("Verifier SRP-6a safety check violated!\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Host -> User: (bytes_s, bytes_B) */ + srp_user_process_challenge( usr, bytes_s, len_s, bytes_B, len_B, &bytes_M ); + + if ( !bytes_M ) + { + printf("User SRP-6a safety check violation!\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* User -> Host: (bytes_M) */ + srp_verifier_verify_session( ver, bytes_M, &bytes_HAMK ); + + if ( !bytes_HAMK ) + { + printf("User authentication failed!\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Host -> User: (HAMK) */ + srp_user_verify_session( usr, bytes_HAMK ); + + if ( !srp_user_is_authenticated(usr) ) + { + printf("Server authentication failed!\n"); + } + +cleanup: + srp_verifier_delete( ver ); + srp_user_delete( usr ); + } + + duration = get_usec() - start; + + printf("Usec per call: %d\n", (int)(duration / NITER)); + + + free( (char *)bytes_s ); + free( (char *)bytes_v ); + + srp_fini(); + + return 0; +} \ No newline at end of file